Reference
Weber Linus. (2023). Taming Capitalism by Rules? A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Capital Doctrine in the European Union. Unpublished Bachelorarbeit, Universität Liechtenstein, Vaduz.
Publication type
Thesis
Abstract
The legal capital doctrine was initially introduced for the purpose of creating adequate safeguards for the protection of creditors from shareholders and managements malpractice of a company’s assets. Within the early 2000s, however, critics emerged indicating that legal capital rules are ineffective and senseless in protecting corporate creditors in developed economies such as the European Union. Consequently, critics advocate that the provisions lack the ability to deliver the purported protection and that alternative measures could sustain preferred results. As a matter of fact, several legal scholars and judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union supported the opposition. Given these salient considerations, this thesis challenges the effectiveness of European legal capital rules in protecting creditor’s ability to enforce claims against a company’s shareholders. The study reveals that the minimum capital requirement emerges as the most vulnerable element within the legal capital doctrine. While the remaining two pillars – capital raising and capital maintenance – effectively fulfill their function of safeguarding corporate creditors, minimum capital falls short, thereby ceases to guarantee security for creditors. Hence, a reformed legal capital doctrine which replaces minimum capital by positive covenants as well as mandatory insurance can lead to more efficient protection of creditors interests.
Persons
Organizational Units
- Company, Foundation & Trust Law