3404375: Corporate Governance in the Financial Services Industry

Beschreibung

• Role and Responsibility of Owners
• Practice of Right of Control for Various Actors
• The Problem of Free Riding
• Major Investors
• Conflicts of Interest Between Financiers
• Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders
• Financial Remuneration of Managers
• Alternative Designs for Option-Based Remuneration Structures for Managers
• Role and Responsibility of Institutions (Accounting, State)
• Corporate Governance in Financial Services Undertakings
• Optimal Design for Corporate Governance
• Empirical Investigations of Corporate Governance

Ziele

• Illustrating role and responsibility of owners
• Explaining right of control
• Describing problem of free riding
• Identifying the special characteristic of major investors
• Describing conflicts of interest
• Scrutinising methods of remuneration of managers
• Describing and critically evaluating differing designs for option-based remuneration structures regarding their effect
• Demonstrating role and responsibility of boards or of the state
• Explaining the special characteristics of Corporate Governance in financial services undertakings
• Developing optimal corporate governance structures
• Contrasting empirical investigations of Corporate Governance

Literatur

Required reading:

• Dittmann, I. /Maug, E. (2007). Lower Salaries and no Options: The optimal Structure of Executive Pay. In: Journal of Finance.

• Van dem Brink, J. /Romeike, F. (2005). Corporate Governance und Risikomanagement in Finanzdienstleistungsbereich. Stuttgart: Schaeffer-Poeschel.
• Menichetti, M. J. (1999). Anreizeffizientes Design von Executive Stock Options. In: Egger, A. /Grün, O. /Moser, R. (Hrsg.) (1999). Managementinstrumente und Konzepte, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, pp. 511-527.

Arbeitsmaterial

Lecture slides will be available on Moodle